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Abstract 
This paper is about the methodology of geoethics qua applied ethics. In particular, I investigate the contributions of phil-
osophical and geoscientific inquiry. My investigation is based on a general model of geoethical research. For each stage of 
this model I explain the expected contribution of “the philosopher” and “the geoscientist” (assuming that they are differ-
ent persons). These general considerations are illustrated by the example of a particular geoethical research question that 
is currently addressed in the Austrian Academy of Sciences project EE-Con. It turns out that geoethical research is a 
complex multi-step process that is highly contingent on philosophical assumptions. In advancing this research it will be 




eoethics addresses questions at the in-
tersection of geoscience and philoso-
phy. One kind of geoethical questions, 
among many others, can be understood as a 
sub-category of what philosophers refer to as 
“applied ethics” (Beauchamp, 2003). Research-
ers in this area investigate controversial geosci-
ence-related moral issues that people face in 
their everyday lives or that are relevant to po-
litical decision-making. In what follows I will 
be exclusively concerned with this particular 
area of geoethical research.  
Geoethics is a growing field of research (see, 
e.g., Bobrowsky et al., 2017; Hourdequin, 2015; 
Peppoloni and Di Capua, 2012; Peppoloni et 
al., 2017; Philips 2012; Wyss and Peppoloni, 
2015). Compared to bioethics, neuroethics and 
other areas of applied ethics, there has so far 
been little reflection on its methodology. In this 
paper I attempt to advance geoethics qua ap-
plied ethics by addressing a particularly im-
portant methodological issue, namely the con-
tribution of philosophical and geoscientific in-
quiry. I hence conform to recent suggestions 
according to which philosophers engaged in 
geoethics are to “offer a synopsis of how the 
various disciplines relate within a given prob-
lem” (Frodeman, 2003: 20), and are “to step in-
to a […] kind of collaboration that investigates 
relationships between the disciplines […]” 
(Stefanovic, 2015: 21). 
In clarifying the relation of philosophical and 
geoscientific inquiry in the above-mentioned 
area of geoethics I will refer to a general model 
of geoethical research in this area. For each 
stage of this model I will explain the expected 
contribution of “the philosopher” and “the ge-
oscientist” (assuming that they are different 
persons). These general considerations will be 
illustrated by the example of a particular geo-
ethical research question that is currently ad-
dressed in the Austrian Academy of Sciences 
project EE-Con (Ortner et al., 2017).  
 
2. DEVELOPING A GEOETHICAL 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The first step in geoethical research is to devel-
op appropriate research questions. Research 
questions in this area need to conform to the 
same general requirements as research ques-
tions in other areas. Most importantly, they 
must be feasible (in terms of the available 
methods, time, money, etc.), interesting (in ad-
G 
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vancing knowledge or being practically rele-
vant), and novel (in going beyond past find-
ings) (see Hulley et al., 2007).  
Philosophers will often be able to contribute 
substantially to developing geoethical research 
questions. Given their background in moral 
theory, they can identify potential moral issues 
reliably, and can formulate interesting and pre-
cise questions about these issues. At the same 
time, geoscientists are indispensable to this 
process as well. They can yield information 
about relevant facts, the results of related geo-
scientific studies, the expected feasibility and 
range of outcomes of future studies, etc.   
In EE-Con geographers found that many resi-
dents of three Austrian alpine valleys expect 
that despite their proper awareness of increas-
ing natural hazards they will be able to contin-
ue to live in these areas. This expectation is 
likely to have shaped the residents’ plans. So if 
at some point in the future the state of Austria 
decided to relocate these residents, it would 
thereby make it difficult or impossible for them 
to realize these plans. One important ethical 
question raised by this potential frustration of 
the residents’ plans — the question that we ad-
dress in EE-Con — looks as follows: Is the 
harm caused by the frustration of residents’ 
expectation morally significant, i.e., does it 
ground a moral claim against relocation or for 
compensation? 
 
3. ADOPTING A GENERAL APPROACH TO 
APPLIED ETHICS 
 
Applied ethical questions can be approached in 
three main ways: top-down, bottom-up, and 
intermediate (see Beauchamp, 2003; 
Hourdequin, 2015).  
According to the top-down approach (e.g., Sing-
er, 1979), answers to such questions must be 
deduced from moral principles (i.e., general 
moral statements that apply to all or particular 
kinds of cases) and the relevant facts. On the 
most abstract level, for example, the question 
of where to build a new landfill might be ad-
dressed as follows: “We ought to act in such a 
way as to maximize overall happiness (utilitar-
ian moral principle). Building the landfill at 
place X will maximize overall happiness (rele-
vant fact). Ergo, the landfill ought to be built at 
place X.”  
According to the bottom-up approach (e.g., 
Toulmin and Jonsen, 1988), applied ethical 
questions are to be answered by paying close 
attention to the specific details of cases rather 
than by deduction from principles. Proponents 
of casuistry, for example, argue that moral 
judgements about particular cases are to be jus-
tified by comparing these cases to similar cases, 
in particular to less controversial ones (e.g., 
comparing the planned landfill with a landfill 
at place Z that caused severe groundwater pol-
lution).  
The intermediate approach combines both top-
down and bottom-up features. According to its 
most prominent variant (e.g., Daniels, 1979), 
one’s general moral principles and considered 
moral judgements about particular cases are 
justified to the extent that they cohere. This 
state of “reflective equilibrium” can be ap-
proached by continued mutual adjustments at 
both levels. For example, if the above utilitarian 
principle conflicts with one’s considered moral 
judgement about where to build the new land-
fill one may refine/reject either or both this 
principle and one’s judgement. 
Whether geoethical questions are approached 
in a top-down, bottom-up or intermediate 
manner is the most important determinant of 
this research’s methodology. Here I will pro-
ceed under the assumption that justifying mor-
al judgements in geoethics at some point and in 
some sense requires deductions from moral 
principles. This assumption is not only con-
sistent with the top-down approach, but also 
with the reflective equilibrium model (propo-
nents of this model just insist that principles 
are open to refinement or rejection) and even 
with some bottom-up approaches (see Beau-
champ, 2003: 9-10). My considerations will 
hence have very broad appeal.  
Concerning the relation of philosophical and 
geoscientific inquiry, the adoption and poten-
tial adjustment of any of the above approaches 
requires considerable philosophical expertise. 
Researchers need to fully understand how 
moral judgements are justified according to 
their preferred approach. But geoscientists are 
essential to this general methodological discus-
sion as well. Most importantly, they will stress 
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and contribute to implementing a problem-
solving — as opposed to primarily theoretical 
— perspective. 
 
4. DEVELOPING, ADOPTING AND/OR 
SPECIFYING A RELEVANT MORAL PRINCIPLE 
 
Given that geoethical research requires deduc-
tions from moral principles, the next step in 
this research consists in developing, adopting 
and/or specifying such principles.  
Some moral principles are claimed to apply on-
ly to particular kinds of cases. Geoscientists are 
necessary in determining whether the case at 
issue falls under the scope of such principles. 
For example, does a particular case of ground-
water pollution only raise intragenerational or 
also intergenerational justice issues? In many 
other respects, developing, adopting and/or 
specifying appropriate moral principles is pri-
marily the responsibility of philosophers (since 
they are familiar with existing moral principles, 
arguments for and against these principles, and 
methods of specifying principles). 
In EE-Con we adopted two principles about the 
moral significance of expectations that were 
developed by Meyer and Sanklecha (2011, 
2014). First, in order for an expectation to be 
morally significant it must be epistemically 
sound, i.e., based on good reasons, as specified 
by a plausible philosophical theory of justifica-
tion (e.g., when a person for no good reason 
expects that she will be given €50 million by 
the state of Austria this expectation’s frustra-
tion clearly does not ground a claim to com-
pensation, apology, etc.). And second, the ex-
pectation must also be just, i.e., meet substan-
tive constraints of pure procedural justice (e.g., 
when a person for good reasons expects that 
she will not be caught cheating on her income 
taxes this expectation’s frustration does not 
ground a claim to compensation, apology, etc. 
either). 
In order to be applicable to controversial cases 
moral principles must often be specified. Draw-
ing on Meyer and Sanklecha’s work (2011, 
2014), we specified the epistemic soundness 
and justice principles roughly as follows. A 
person’s expectation is epistemically sound if 
(E1) the person has reason to believe that the 
state has ensured the expectation’s fulfillment 
in the past and will not discontinue to ensure 
this fulfillment in the future, or (E2) the person 
has reason to believe that the state expresses 
that it will ensure the expectation’s fulfillment. 
A person’s expectation is just if and only if (J1) 
the expectation is not based on impartial con-
siderations, and (J2) the expectation is con-
sistent with her general views about justice. 
 
5. DERIVING A TESTABLE GEOSCIENTIFIC 
HYPOTHESIS FROM THE MORAL PRINCIPLE 
 
From their preferred moral principle(s) geoeth-
icists must next derive testable geoscientific 
hypotheses. This will often be a two-step pro-
cess. First, one must identify the kind(s) of facts 
about the particular case at issue that, accord-
ing to the principle, are morally relevant (this 
step requires detailed knowledge of the princi-
ple, and is thus mainly within the domain of 
philosophy). And second, one must develop 
testable geoscientific hypotheses that allow for 
conclusions about the facts identified in step 
one (this step requires detailed knowledge 
about the particular case and about geoscien-
tific methods, and is thus mainly within the 
domain of geoscience).  
Recall the above principle according to which 
expectations can only be morally significant if 
they can be inferred from states’ past behavior 
(E1) or states’ expressions (E2). From this prin-
ciple it can be inferred that determining the 
moral significance of residents’ expectation that 
they will be able to continue to live in our 
study areas requires investigating whether this 
expectation is grounded in past behavior or 
expressions by the state of Austria (Step 1). 
These questions may then be explored by test-
ing various kinds of geoscientific hypotheses; 
for example, that help from disaster relief 
funds has not decreased over the last decades 
or that the state still issues building permits for 
our study areas (Step 2). 
 
6. IDENTIFYING THE GEOSCIENTIFIC 
METHODS MOST APPROPRIATE FOR 
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS 
 
Depending on the moral principle and the par-
ticular case, the geoscientific hypotheses at is-
sue may be such that testing them requires 
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studies in both or either physical geoscience 
and human geoscience. Many of the following 
considerations apply to studies of both kinds. 
My primary object of investigation, however, 
will be geoethical research that is based on 
studies in human geoscience (such as in EE-
Con).  
Human geoscientists use a variety of different 
methods. Abstracting from any practical con-
straints, the method(s) that geoethicists should 
adopt in testing their geoscientific hypotheses 
is that (are those) method(s) that can be ex-
pected to provide the strongest evidence with 
regard to the hypothesis. In the EE-Con project, 
for example, we investigated residents’ beliefs, 
emotions and behaviors regarding natural haz-
ards and their potential resettlement both by 
questionnaires (to obtain more objective, unbi-
ased data) and by structured interviews (to 
gain deeper insight into the underlying causes 
of these beliefs, emotions and behaviors). 
Determining which method(s) can be expected 
to provide the strongest evidence with regard 
to the geoscientific hypothesis at issue requires 
both theoretical knowledge about geoscientific 
methods and experience in employing them. 
Thus, it will typically fall in the domain of the 
geoscientist. 
 
7. DEVELOPING A SPECIFIC RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
 
Based on their general choice of methods, re-
searchers in geoethics next need to develop (a) 
specific design(s) for their geoscientific study 
(studies). Questionnaire studies, for example, 
raise the following issues: What is the required 
sample size? How ought one to formulate in-
structions, scenarios, questions, and answer 
choices? Should one use open-ended or close-
ended questions (or both)?  
Obviously, the geoscientific studies employed 
in geoethical research should have as much in-
ternal and external validity as possible. Ensur-
ing this goal is again mainly the responsibility 
of the geoscientist (who is familiar with the rel-
evant methods and with potential problems in 
employing them). In addition, philosophical 
expertise may be helpful in designing certain 
kinds of geoscientific studies in geoethics too. 
This is especially true for studies that attempt 
to test subjects’ philosophical views. Such stud-
ies will only be internally valid if the philo-
sophical concepts figuring in their instructions, 
scenarios, questions, and answer choices are 
used properly — and philosophers are typical-
ly more familiar with these concepts.  
Recall J1, the first condition of EE-Con’s justice 
principle (according to which a person’s expec-
tation can only be morally significant if it is 
consistent with her general views about jus-
tice). In order to test whether residents’ expec-
tation to be able to continue to live in our study 
areas fulfills this condition one’s study must 
include answer choices that, if residents chose 
them, would indicate that their expectation is 
not consistent with their general views about 
justice. A view that might be relevant here is 
libertarianism, which claims that states’ only 
legitimate function is to protect citizens from 
criminal behavior (e.g., Nozick, 1974). Suppose 
a resident’s study responses indicate that s/he 
is drawn to libertarianism. As this general view 
about justice in some sense conflicts with the 
expectation that the state will offer protection, 
aid and relief with regard to natural hazards, 
such a finding would support that the resi-
dent’s expectation lacks in moral significance. 
 
8. CONDUCTING THE GEOSCIENTIFIC 
STUDY 
 
With a complete research design at hand, re-
searchers in geoethics can finally go on to test 
their morally relevant geoscientific hypothesis. 
Several issues in the philosophy of science 
might be relevant to this task, e.g., the theory-
dependence and value-ladenness of scientific 
observations. Apart from these general issues, 
however, testing the morally relevant geoscien-
tific hypothesis is obviously the task of the geo-
scientist. Hence, I will not explain this step any 
further. 
 
9. ASSESSING THE STUDY’S 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GEOSCIENTIFIC 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
In order to be able to support or undermine a 
particular hypothesis the data resulting from 
one’s geoscientific studies must be interpreted. 
Given their training and experience, geoscien-
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tists are better suited to performing this task 
than philosophers. They identify trends in the 
data more rapidly and reliably, are more aware 
of common cognitive biases, etc. Again, how-
ever, the philosopher’s conceptual knowledge 
may prove helpful as well — in particular with 
studies that address subjects’ philosophical 
views.  
In the study that led to EE-Con’s geoethical re-
search question, for example, many subjects in 
both the questionnaires and interviews strong-
ly agreed that “[t]he society is responsible for 
the protection against natural hazards”. At first 
sight this finding might be thought to support 
the study’s hypothesis that most residents ex-
pect the society to protect them against natural 
hazards. But this interpretation would be 
flawed. To expect that an agent performs an 
action means to believe that the agent will per-
form that action (Meyer and Sanklecha, 2014: 
2). By saying that an agent is responsible for 
performing an action, however, we express that 
the agent ought to perform rather than that s/he 
actually will perform that action — and it is 
possible and common to believe that agents 
ought to perform actions that they actually will 
not perform. Hence, the finding that residents 
of our study areas agreed that the society is re-
sponsible for protecting them against natural 
hazards does not by itself entail that they ex-
pect the society to do so. 
 
10. ASSESSING THE STUDY’S 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GEOETHICAL 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Given that all previous tasks were performed 
successfully, the interpretation of one’s geosci-
entific data will either support or undermine 
one’s geoscientific hypothesis. The final step in 
geoethical research qua applied ethical research 
is to assess the implications of this result for 
one’s geoethical research question.  
One important determinant of this assessment 
is one’s general approach to applied ethics. 
Suppose one’s moral principle(s) (e.g., EE-
Con’s justice principle) and geoscientific find-
ings (e.g., our interview data) entail a moral 
judgement that conflicts with one’s considered 
judgement about the case at issue (e.g., that res-
idents’ expectation that they will be able to 
continue to live in our study areas is morally 
significant). On the top-down approach one 
would then have to give up one’s considered 
moral judgement. The reflective equilibrium 
model, in contrast, also allows the rejection or 
refinement of the principle, and thus requires 
further philosophical (and perhaps geoscien-
tific) research.  
When one assumes more than one moral prin-
ciple, answering geoethical research questions 
may also require weighing the judgements en-
tailed by one principle against the judgements 
entailed by others. Moreover, issues of feasibil-
ity may have to be considered as well. Sup-
pose, for example, it turned out that residents’ 
above expectation grounds a claim to not being 
resettled. Accounting for this expectation (i.e., 
protecting residents from increasing natural 
hazards) may be costly — so costly that the 
state of Austria may become unable to (fully) 
meet other morally significant expectations of 
its citizens (such as students’ expectations to 
receive scholarships). To arrive at an all-things-
considered judgement, answering EE-Con’s 
geoethical research question would thus re-
quire weighing this expectation against other 
morally significant expectations.  
In any case, as the above considerations 
demonstrate, assessing one’s study’s implica-
tions for the geoethical research question is 
primarily the task of the philosopher (as s/he is 
more familiar with approaches to applied eth-
ics, the weighing of principle, the implications 
of infeasibility, etc.). The geoscientist will main-
ly be important when it comes to translating 




This paper focused on geoethics qua applied 
ethics. In particular, I asked about the contribu-
tions of philosophical and geoscientific inquiry 
to geoethics in this sense. It turned out that 
even on a simplified and idealized representa-
tion geoethical research is a complex multi-step 
process that is highly contingent on philosoph-
ical assumptions. Moreover, there is no clear-
cut division of labor between philosophers and 
geoscientists. At various stages geoethical re-
search requires intensive exchange and collab-
oration. In advancing geoethics it will thus be 
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helpful for philosophers and geoscientists to 
work together more closely than they have 
done so far. 
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